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I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
=~.;D RU~NER INN, INC. , and * 
~30LD M. SMITHSON, 
* 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Case No. 15374 
* 
-vs-
* 
::cGLAS C. MERRILL, 
* 
Defendant, and 
* 
:~LLEEN B. MERRILL, 
* 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal petitions the Court to affirm the conveyance 
:ram Defendant Douglas C. Merrill of his interest in the family home 
o~d real property to Defendant-Respondent Colleen B. Merrill, as con-
~us1ve against Plaintiff-Appellants Road Runner Inn, Inc., and Harold 
· .. Smithson on the grounds that being part of the settlement of the 
:1vorce action between the grantor and grantee, the conveyance was for 
0 :'air consideration. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 27, 1976, Defendant-Respondent, Colleen B. 
'ernll, (Respondent Colleen Merrill) sued Defendant, Douglas C. 
'~rill, (Defendant Douglas '.'1errill) for divorce in the Third Judi-
01 District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. D 21418. 
~dent Colleen Merrill, alleged extreme mental cruelty. On April ' 
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12, 1976, the Merrills entered into a Stipulation and Property Se. 
tlement. Defendant Douglas Merrill agreed, inter alia, to convey 
his interest in the family home and real property to Repondent cc:.
1 
Merrill. Pursuant to the Stipulation, Defendant Douglas Merrill 
executed a quit-claim deed conveying any and all of his interest 1. 
the family home and real property to Respondent, Colleen Merrill. 
June 21, 1976, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge, entered ths 
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce in the action and therein approvec 
the property settlement. 
On June 30, 1976, Plaintiff-Appellants Road Runner Inn, :, 
(Appellant Road Runner) and Harold M. Smithson, (Appellant Smithso:. 
sued Defendant, Douglas Merrill and Respondent, Colleen Merrill, i: 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Civil No. 236092, for breach of a construction contract. Appell~' 
Road Runner and Smithson alleged damages in the amount of $28, 300. 
and, naming Respondent Colleen Merrill as a Defendant, asked that· 
conveyance from Defendant to Respondent be set aside. 
On October 6, 1976, Appellants filed a Motion to Intervt 
in the divorce action between the Merrills. Distressed, Responder.: 
Colleen Merrill, yielded to Appellants' demanded Stipulation that' 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce not be conclusive against Jl.ppellant 5 
to the fairness of the consideration for the conveyance. The div~ 
court approved the stipulation and issued the final Judgment and '.c 
cree. 
t' On August 15, 1978, in the breach of contract action 
Honorable James s. Sawaya, Judge, awarded Appellants judgment ac~ 
2 
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:efendant, Douglas Merrill, in the amount of $28,300.00. The learned 
·ur1st concluded, however, that the conveyance from Defendant, Douglas 
·•errill, of his interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen 
·.:errill, "being part of the settlement of the divorce action between 
;ran tor and grantee, was for a fair consideration." (Amended Con-
clusion of Law, No. 5) Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was granted a 
iudgment of no cause of action and was dismissed. (Amended Conclusion 
of Law, No. 7) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Colleen Merrill, pleads the Court to affirm the 
conclusion of the trial court that the conveyance from Defendant, 
Douglas Merrill, of his interest in the family home and real property, 
'oeing part of the settlement of the divorce action between the granter 
wd grantee, was for a fair consideration. 
STATEMENT OF F.11.CTS 
In 1965, Defendant, Douglas Merrill, and Respondent, Colleen 
~rrill, then his wife, received a vacant lot located at 2341 Neffs 
~ane, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift from C.L. Merrill, Defendant's 
father. Defendant and Respondent both possessed substantial construction 
skills, learned in their youths from working alongside their fathers. 
:s newlyweds, the Merrills had refined their skills through six (6) 
~ars of building churches throughout the United States. Respondent 
1ad taught women in Relief Society how to lay floors, hang ceiling tile 
'·d insulate buildings. The Merrills, accordingly, decided to build 
--~P1r own home together upon the property they had been given. 
For two(2) years, Respondent Colleen Merrill, labored in de-
--
J 
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signing and constructing for her growing family their first home. 
Her efforts never flagged. During six (6) months when Defendant, '.•: 
Merrill, was hospitalized, Respondent hung sheet rock, laid floor: 
tiled the roof, painted the interior and exterior, completed the!: 
work and landscaped the 55' x 165' lot. The church supported t~ \ 
ily; Defendant could not provide. On March 11, 1967, the Merrills, 
their three(3) children were able to move into the home. 
Al though talented as a builder, Defendant Douglas Merrii. 
lacked the financial acumen to manage the tamily' s resources. Mato: 
ials used in constructing the home were obtained on credit; unbek~c~ 
to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, creditors were not paid. Several ;) 
the accounts went to judgment. It became necessary to borrow aga1:. 
the equity in the home. 
In 1968, .l\merican Savings loaned $13,000.00 against a 
twenty(20) year first deed of trust. $4,300.00 was used to reti~ 
debt for plumbing supplies owed to Respondent's father; $1,000.00 
went to the friend in whose name the $13, 000. 00 loan had been obtair..: 
because Defendant, Douglas Merrill, had such a poor credit rating: 
judgment liens were cleared; hospital bills were paid; the balance 
purchased a 1967 Thunder Bird and new furniture. New judgments ar:•1 
In 1973, Murray First Thrift loaned $15,000.00 against a! 
six ( 6) year second deed of trust. Judgments were paid with part :: i 
the money; the balance purchased a 1973 Thunderbird and an 18 foot 
Starfire boat. Defendant Douglas Merrill defaulted on the loan. 
t · s - I On February 10, 1976, Clarence J. Bowden, Responden -· 
loaned $3,310.00 against a third deed of trust. The money was uc: ' 
4 l 
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reinstate the Murray First Thrift second deed of trust following notice 
Jf foreclosure. New judgments remained unpaid. 
In 1968, the year after Respondent had completed the constuc-
:ion of the family home, Respondent began working in order to help 
support the family. Her wages from Warshaw's, Skagg's, and ZCMI were 
' small, in 1972, she obtained her real estate license. She worked for 
.'iR~S as a commissioned, self employed saleswoman until January 1975, 
~en family and marital problems clamored for her attention. Without 
'espondent's income, the Merrill family struggled to survive. The 
church provided support; the Merrills purchased food with food stamps. 
Beleagured by Defendant, Douglas Merrill's improvident impecienities, 
Respondent Colleen Merrill, returned again to work in 1976. 
On tebruary 27, 1976, Respondent filed for divorce from 
Jefendant Douglas Merrill on the grounds of mental cruelty. On April 
12, 1976, the Merrills entered into a Stipulation and Property Settle-
~ent. Defendant Douglas Merrill agreed, inter alia, to convey his 
interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen Merrill. 
The home appraised for $38,000.00. First, second and third 
deeds of trust encumbered the home in the total amount of $26,348.00. 
Outstanding judgments amounted to $1,540.00. The unencumbered equity, 
therefore, amounted to $10,112.00. Respondent, as a joint tenant had 
an interest valued at $5,056.00; Defendant's interest was also valued 
at $5,056.00. Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was entitled to claim out 
Jf his undivided one-half (12) joint tenancy interest, a homestead ex-
'mption amounting to $6,700.00 ($4,500.00 head of family; $1,500.00 
0s spouse; $1, 2 00. 00 two other members of family) . The $6, 700. 00 
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homestead exemption exceeded the $ 5, 056. 00 equity to which Defer,~2 •. 
was entitled. Thus the quit-claim deed which Defendant executed ~ 
suant to the Stipulation and Property Settlement conveyed an inte~ 
in property to Respondent which was beyond the reach of creditors . 
of record. Respondent, however, was not aware that Defendant had:.: 
paid the materialmen and sub-contractors on the Road Runner const:·.; 
project begun March 17, 1975. As grantee, Respondent believed s~, 
fairly settling divorce matters with Defendant. 
The trial court wisely concluded that the conveyance ~:J 
claim deed from Defendant Douglas Merrill of his interest in the td 
home and real property to Respondent Colleen Merrill being part of I 
settlement of the divorce action between the granter and grantee.··: 
for a fair consideration. The decision of the trial court should:-
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFENDANT, DOUGLAS MERRILL, OF HIS INTEREi' 
IN THE FAMILY HOME AND REAL PROPERTY TO RESPONDENT, COLLEEN MERRIL'. 
BEING PART OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN THE GR:c:: 
AND GRANTEE, WAS FOR A FAIR CONSIDERATION. 
The award of the home to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, so· 
she would have the benefit and use thereof in providing for the ch:. 
was fair, reasonable, and equitable, and well within the comparat:·' 
wide latitude of discretion that the Utah Supreme Court has always 
recognized the trial court should have in such matters. Cirau~ 
Ciraulo, 576 P2d 884 (Utah 1978). In Ciraulo, the divorced wife :e 
ceived $9,000.00 equity in a home valued at $30,000.00. The tna: 
findings recited, " •.. there were periods of time during their :nc:· 
6 
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~en the defendant failed to make any payments to support ... the 
(wife) and the minor children" Accordingly, the trial court found 
1 t: 
reasonable and proper that the court award to the 
(wife) in lieu of any such claim the eguity that 
the parties have in said real property and that 
therefore the real property should be awarded to 
the (wife) free and clear of any claim of the 
defendant, and subject only to the outstanding 
indebtedness thereon". (Utah Supreme Court's 
emphasis) 
In the case at bar, not only did Respondent, Colleen Merrill, have a 
complaint against Defendant, Douglas Merrill, for his failure during 
their marriage to support her and their minor children. She could 
also claim to have benefi tted Defendant by the thousands of dollars 
worth of labor she expended in building the house. 
The Court historically has recognized the value of a wife's 
~penditures on her husband's behalf. In Lund v. Howell, 67 P2d 215 
(Utah 19 3 7) , the Court refused to set aside an assignment of an un-
~~ded interest in an estate as a fraud upon creditors of the husband. 
There, the wife had spent $4,000.00 of her own money in building a 
house in Salt Lake City. The home was thereafter mortgaged and sub-
stantial amounts of the proceeds were advanced to pay the husband's 
lebts in Idaho. The wife did not know that her husband was unable to 
iay his bills. In 1928, creditors obtained judgments against the 
1usband amounting to $4,881.00. In 1930, he became an heir to an 
0state. He assigned his interest to his wife. The creditors attacked 
~e assignment, challenging the wife's good faith and the sufficiency 
!~the consideration she had given for the assignment. The Court up-
i]d the assignment, relying upon definite documentary evidence that 
L 
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the funds received from the mortgage of the house in which she r.a~ 
invested her own money had gone directly for payment of the husbar: 
debts. 
Here, the labor Respondent, Colleen Merrill, invested~-
came the equity against which Defendant, Douglas Merrill, borrowed· 
provide for the family. Defendant's conveyance to Respondent me~: 
returned to her a part of the value she had created. The conveyar.:, 
scarcely discharged Defendant's ill-performed duty to support Resper.:, 
and their minor children. It was clearly within the divorce court• 
prerogative to make whatever disposition of property it deemed fa1: 
equitable and necessary for the protection and welfare of the part;•' 
English v. English. 565 P2d 409 (Utah 1977); Naylor v. Naylor, 563; 
148 (Utah 1977); Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P2d 1080 (Utah 1977): Bak:: 
v. Baker, 551 P2d 1263 (Utah 1976). 
A. WHILE THE CONVEYANCE BETWEEN DIVORCING SPOUSES MIGHT; 
SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY, NONETHELESS, THE TRANSACTION IS NOT ~E:­
ESSARILY INVALID, AND THE TRUE FACTS ARE SUBJECT TO PROOF. 
Appellants object to the trial court's conclusion that::• 
conveyance, "being part of the settlement of the divorce action bet• 
the granter and grantee, was for a fair consideration." Appellant! 
correctly state the proposition that any conveyance between re lat: 
is subject to rigid scrutiny. Divorcing spouses connot be denom1n:· 
relatives. Appellants admit on page fourteen(l4) of Appellants'?: 
that; 
no case has been found which specifically holds a 
conveyance to be fraudulent under facts identical 
to those in the case at bar. 
Appellants attempt, however, to weave an argument from the shreG' 
8 
--
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-: farnilially dissimilar fact patterns to save their case. Their 
o'.:t2rnpt must fail. 
The case at bar concerns neither a conveyance between 
:r0thers, Smith v. Popham, 513 P2d 1172 (Oregon 1973), nor a con-
·.·eyance between parent and child, Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U2d 
.-3, 369 P2d 962 (1962); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 U2d 287, 351 P2d 959 
J960); Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P2d 135 (1948). De-
· ~ndant, Douglas Merrill, conveyed his interest in the family home to 
~spondent, Colleen Merrill, pursuant to a court-approved property 
settlement in the divorce action she brought against him; the familial 
, relationship was over. 
The case at bar concerns neither a conveyance for which the 
:onsideration was support of the grantor, Brain v. Gould, 46 Ill. 293 
1867), nor a voluntary conveyance by which the grantor secured to 
'tmself a continuing financial benefit by relieving himself of the 
:urden of supporting his wife in the future, Detroit Security Trust 
:" v. Gitre, 254 Mich. 66, 235 NW 884 (1931); Augurgh v. Lydston, 117 
L1 l 
·• . App. 574 (1905 . 
I 
Respondent will not support Defendant; Defendant 
\Qll not be relieved of his duty to support his minor children and 
L. 
:;eir mother. 
j 
j _ade in The case at bar does not concern a conveyance from a husband consideration of the wife's forbearance in pursuing a meritorious 
::vorce action, National Surety Co. v. Wittich, 184 Minn. 44, 237 NW 
·in (1931); First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Enzler, 537 P2d 517 
-oska 1975): Oppenheimer v. Collins, 115 Wis. 283, 91 NW 690 (1902). 
~~. when Appellants intervened Respondent, Colleen Merrill, refused 
1 ·.: be deterred in her suit for divorce from Defendant, Douglas Merrill. 
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The case at bar does resemble Lieberman v. Kelso, 354 ;~ 
137 (Fla App 1978). In that case, the husband conveyed his ent 1 ~ 
interest in the family home to the wife pursuant to a judgment of 
dissolution of marriage. The wife was "not aware of the existence 
of appellant's judgment against the husband at the time of the di~ 
The court upheld the conveyance noting, in passing, that the arm's-
length nature of the transaction was further buttressed by the ~~ 
that the settlement agreement required the wife to convey her int~ 
in certain other property to the husband. Lieberman is significan: 
because the court believed, in essence; 
that the transfer of the husband's (entireties) 
interest to the wife pursuant to the judgment 
of dissolution was equivalent to the defeasance 
of the husband's interest in the property which 
would have occurred had he predeceased his wife 
while the parties were still married. 
In other words, _11.ppel lants had never levied execution upon their ; .. · 
ment, hence the judgment had never attached to the husband's undiv::O 
one-half(~) entireties interest in the home. When the husband con•:' 1 
his entireties interest, the wife received the home free of the j~ 
ment lien. (Emphasis added) 
In the case at bar, Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was n~ j 
aware that Defendant, Douglas Merrill, had not paid the materialmer . 
and sub-contractors on the Road Runner Inn, construction project::. 
judgment existed at the time of the divorce conveyance. Responde: 
had no interest in any other property to convey, in exchange, to ~i­
fendant. Nevertheless, al though the Stipulation and Property Set:-' 
ment required Defendant to assume and pay all debts and obligatio:. 
curred by the parties during the marriage, Respondent sold prope:-
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she received in the settlement and used her own income as well to pay 
Jff as many of those debts as she possibly could. Defendant, Douglas 
~rrill, even then, could not fulfill his stipulated and decreed ob-
ligations. Clearly, the facts of the case at bar justify application 
of the Lieberman rule that the conveyance of an undivided joint pro-
~rty interest from one divorcing spouse to the other, pursuant to a 
court approved property settlement, vests the property in the grantee 
free of any unexecuted judgment lien. 
It cannot be said that the tremendous labor Respondent, Colleen 
:.1errill, expended in constructing the home for her family amounted to 
a lack of consideration for the conveyance. It cannot be said that 
the eight years Respondent worked to help support the family amounted 
to'a lack of consideration for the conveyance. It certainly cannot 
be said that an equity valued at even less than the minimum homestead 
exemption was a disproportionately large amount to settle upon a 
divorcing wife with custody of two minor children after twenty years 
of marriage. The evidence in the trial court was clear and satis-
factory that Respondent, Colleen Merrill, accepted the conveyance of 
Defendant's interest in the family home in good faith and not to hinder 
or defraud Defendant's creditors. Respondent entreats the Court to 
assure her that she and her children will no longer have to pay for 
~fendant's failure to pay his debts. 
Appellants Road Runner and Smithson, like Colleen Merrill 
c1scovered too late that that Defendant, Douglas Merrill, lacked the 
3~1lity to perform his contractual obligations. Appellants could have 
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Colleen Merrill, could do little more than free herself from the 
bonds of a costly relationship. To force Respondent and her two 
children out of the home she built for them would be to exact t~ 
final pound of flesh from a woman who has paid dearly already fN 
vows. The Court must affirm the conveyance from Defendant of his 
interest in the family home and real property to Respondent, Colle; 
Merrill as conclusive against Appellants Road Runner and Smithson. 
the grounds that, being part of the settlement of the divorce act~ 
between the granter and grantee, the conveyance was for a fair m.: 
sideration. 
B. PRIOR TO THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFEN':JANT, RESPONDENT 
POSSESSED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE FAMILY HOME BY 
VIRTUE OF HER STATUS AS JOINT TENANT. 
An estate in joint tenancy is one held by two or more per-
1 
sons jointly, with equal rights to share in its enjoyment during t·l 
lives and having as its distinguishing feature the right of surv1n 
ship, or j us accrescendi, by virtue of which the entire estate, Uf:· 
the death of a joint tenant, goes to the survivor free and exempt :i 
I 
11 charges made by his deceased cotenant. 20 Am.Jur. 2d, CotenaEJ 
and Ownership, Sec. 3, p. 94. One joint tenant has not, by reasor I 
of the relationship, any authority to bind his cotenant with respe:r 
to the latter'~ presumedly equal 
Stark v. Loker et. al., 129 P2d 
interest in the common property. I 
390 (Ca. 1942). Execution may ~1 
upon the interest of one of the joint tenants while all joint tenc::! 
are alive, and upon purchase of the interest of one of the joint ! 
tenants at execution sale the joint tenancy is severed, and purchc;~ 
and other joint -tenants "become tenants in common." Zeigler v. 
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~nnell, 126 P2d 118 (Ca. 1942); Pepin v. Stricklen, 114 Cal. A.pp. 
32, 299. P. 557 (1931). The mere docketing of a judgment against a 
ioint tenant does not effect a severance of the interest of such 
tenant. Musa v. Segelke & K. Co., 272 NW 657 (Wis. 1937). A ten-
ancy by entireties resembles a joint tenancy; a tenancy by entireties 
~n only be created between husband and wife, however. 
The Lieberman case, supra, concerned the conveyance from a 
husband to his divorcing wife of his undivided one-half entireties 
interest in the family home pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of 
marriage. There, the divorcing wife received the property free and 
exempt from an unexecuted judgment lien that she did not know existed 
against the husband. The court believed that the conveyance; 
as equivalent to the defeasance of the husband's 
interest in the property which would have occurred 
had he predeceased his wife while the parties were 
still married. 
The case at bar concerns a joint tencany, rather than a 
tenancy by entireties as in Lieberman. The facts are strikingly 
similar. Defendant, Douglas Merrill, conveyed his undivided one-half 
Joint tenancy interest in the family home to his divorcing wife, Re-
spondent, Colleen Merrill, pursuant to a court approved divorce pro-
perty settlement. Respondent was not event aware of the possibility 
of Appellants' judgment against Defendant husband. Respondent there-
fore urges the Court to adopt the reasoning of the Florida Court and 
to declare that Respondent received the home free of any potential 
Judgment lien that might have arisen because of Defendant's in~bility 
·s perform his contractual obligations. 
C. CONVEYANCE TO RESPONDENT OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY INTEREST 
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EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION CANNOT BE ATTACHED BY CREDITORS. 
On April 12, 1976, Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was entit 
to claim out of his undivided one-half joint tenancy interest in 
family home a homestead exemption in the amount of $6, 700.00 ($4,. 
head of family; $1,500.00 spouse; plus $1,200.00 two other memeber: 
the family). Utah Homestead Act, Section 28-1-1 et. ~' Utah co: 
Annotated, (1953). 
The homestead exemption provided for .... is 
not strictly an estate or property passing to 
those who are under the law entitled to enjoy 
it, but rather a protection to them in its 
enjoyment against the demands of creditors. 
If the estate is solvent and there are no 
creditors, no protection is needed .... Knudsen 
v. Hannberg, 8 U 203, 30 P 749 (1892). 
Failure to make a homestead declaration does not impair t,
1 
homestead right, so long as evidence shows that spouses were reside~ 
of the state when the conveyance was executed and continued to res::J 
therein, that husband owned no other land and that the family did : 1 
did not include children. Williams vs. Peterson, 46 P2d 674 (Ut~ 
1935). In that case, the husband executed a Promissory Note and~1 
gage in her favor to compensate her for her share of money held ir ! 
joint account that he was investing in business. Creditors sued~ 
set aside the mortgage alleging a fraudulent conveyance. The tr::. 
court failed or refused to make any findings with reference to 
whether or not the mortgaged property was exempt from execution 
the homestead law. The Court stated that: 
if the property was exempt it is wholly immaterial 
so far as the (creditor) is concerned whether or 
not there was any consideration for the mortgage, 
The Court noted, in addition, that: 
14 
ur.::I 
1 
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upon the failure of the husband, he being the 
judgment debtor, to claim and select a home-
stead, it is the privileg~ of the wife to do 
so. 
~cordingly, the Court upheld the wife's claim of homestead in her 
husband's undivided one-half interest in their jointly owned farm. 
Similarly in Smith v. Popham, supra, the grantee of land 
hh1ch was the gr an tor's homestead, who never claimed, was entitled 
to raise the homestead exemption as a defense to a suit to set aside 
conveyances on the ground that they were made to defraud creditors. In 
that case, as in Leiberman, supra, the Oregon Court ruled that the 
grantee of the homestead took the property free of the creditor's 
Judgment, unless the grantor had lost his homestead exemption such as 
by abandonment. 
An owner of homestead property exempt from execution may con-
~y it to anyone, including his wife, without having to conveyance 
overthrown as defrauding his creditors, provided he makes the proper 
defense when such transaction is assailed. Cardon v. Harper, 151 P2d 
99 (Utah 1944). In Stearns vs. Stearns, 126 NW 2d 124 (S. Dak. 1964), 
an assignment to the divorced wife of possession of the homestead was 
proper in order to provide a home for the minor children. That one has 
conveyed property in fraud of creditors does not prevent him from 
:laiming it as a homestead; such right being for the benefit of the 
'.amily, cannot be frittered away even by the head of the family. 
~son Exchange Savings Bank v. Tietjen, 225 P 598 (Utah 1924). The 
"~estead claim provided for in Article XXII Section 1 of the Utah 
.0nsti tution may be made at any time before sale or execution. Utah 
2l!i_lders' supply co. v. Gardner, 42 P2d 989 (Utah 1935); Kimball v. 
-
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Salisbury, 17 U 381, 53 P 1037 (1898); Folsom v. Asper, 25 u 299, -. 
p 315 (1903). 
In the case at bar, Defendant, Douglas Merrill, was a res: 
dent of the State of Utah at the time of the quit-claim deed to ~-
spondent, Colleen Merrill, Defendant owned no other lands in which 
to claim the homestead exemption; the family included two minor cri 1:, 
ren. The trial Court made no express finding with respect tot~~ 
stead exemption to which Defendant was constitutionally entitled. 
Nevertheless, such finding is implicit in the trial court's conclus.I 
that the said transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and real pro-
perty from Defendant, Douglas Merrill, to Respondent, Colleen Merr:: 1 
was not a fraudulent conveyance. (Amended Conclusion of Law No. 6: 
Evidence revealed that the house appraised for $38, 000. 00 at the U 
of the conveyance. First, second, and third deeds of trust encumbe:j 
the property in the amount of $25,348.00. Existing liens totaled 
$1,540.00. The unencumbered equity held in joint tenancy, thereto~: 
amounted to $10,112.00. Respondent by virtue of her undivided one-I 
i 
half interest claimed an equity valued at $5,056.00; Defendant sim· 
I 
larly claimed an equity valued at $5,056.00. The homestead exempt::1 
of $6, 700. 00 to which Defendant was entitled exceeded the value of ·1 
equity he conveyed. The interest Defendant, Douglas Merrill, trar.=
1 
· 
ferred to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was exempt from execution. '. 
Clearly, the Court must affirm the conveyance from Defendant, Doug) : 
Merrill, of his interest in the family home and real property to ?' · . 
spondent, Colleen Merrill, as conclusive against Appellants Road:. 
ner and Smithson. 
16 
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POINT II 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT CONVEYANCE WAS MADE 
,;I'fH INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD APPELLANTS. 
Where the Supreme Court finds that the prepoderance df the 
evidence supports -t:he trial court findings, or has doubt as to where 
:~preponderance lies, or finds that the evidence may slightly pre-
ponderate against the trial court's conclusion, but such preponderance 
ray be offset by the trial court's better position to judge the credi-
oility of the witness, the Supreme Court will not reverse. Boccalero 
v. Bee, et. al., 126 P2d 1063 (Utah 1942); Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U 250, 
?4 P2d 65 (Utah 1939). The Supreme Court makes considerable allowance 
fur the advantageous position of the trial court in close proximity to 
the parties and witnesses, which provided a better basis for insight 
into the truthfulness of the testimony offered than is afforded by 
:eview of the record. Givan v. Lambeth, supra. 
Appellants alleged in the trial court that the conveyance 
~s not made for a fair consideration and that the conveyance was made 
·nth intent to hinder, delay and defraud them in the collection of 
their claim against Defendant, Douglas Merrill. Appellants had a full 
and fair opportunity to present their case. The honored and learned 
~i~ judge was not persuaded; the evidence failed to preponderate in 
'.avor of Appellants' allegations. Appellants maintain that the trial 
:ourt erred in its determination; the facts on appeal do not support 
:~eir contention that the conveyance by Defendant, Douglas Merrill, of 
•s interest in the family home to Respondent, Colleen Merrill, was 
'ie with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Appellant Road Run-
·er. The court should affirm the trial court's conclusion that "the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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transfer was not a fraudulent conveyance". (Amended Conclusion of 
No. 6.) 
A. EVIDENCE DISCLOSES NO FRAUD OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY 
FRAUD ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT. 
An intent to delay or defraud a creditor is not to be imp'. 
from the execution of the deed; the cooperative fraud of the granter 
and grantee together must be shown. Billings v. Parsons, 53, p 73C 
(Utah 1898). 
In that case, debtor husband paid appellant a small sumfc 
wages due and on the same day gave the wife $100 worth of goods. Tr. 
following day, the husband executed a deed of assignment for the bei, 
fit of creditors of the inventory of his store. Appellant as credi:: 
attacked the transfer of the $100.00 worth of goods to the wife as: 
concealment of assets. The source of the goods was not shown. The 
wife was in no way implicated in the husband's fraud. The Court ru'.i 
that a fraudulent intent on the part of the granter alone was not 5':: 
ficient to avoid the transfer when no preference was made and where 
the grantee did not participate in the fraud. In Ogden State Bank..l; 
Barker, 40 P 769 (Utah 1895) , the Court noted that if such preferenc: 
were made with a fraudulent design, or with intent to hinder and del: 
the appellant in his collection of the judgment, still, if the grar.:: 
did not participate in the fraud or have any knowledge of it, the v:· 
lidity of the conveyance would not be affected. 
The Court considered the innocence of the grantee in a re:! 
recent case. In Boccalero v. Bee, supra, the Court decided in 194: 
a judgment debtor assigned his one-seventh interest in his father' 
estate to his sister. Cancelled checks dating back ten years 
18 
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; 1shed that debtor owed his sister $3,600.00. The sister had no know-
iedge of her brother's financial difficulties at the time of the con-
,;eyance. The Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the 
oonveyance was made in good faith, for sufficient consideration and 
.. : 
rlthout intent to defraud. 
In the case at bar, the record discloses no fraud or partici-
1ation in any fraud on the part of Respondent, Colleen Merrill. At 
:\the time of the conveyance, Respondent was not aware that Defendant, 
.\ ;ouglas Merrill, had not paid materialmen and sub-contractors on the 
I 
:jload Runner Inn, Inc. construction project. The value of the interest 
\ :onveyed to Respondent for the use and benefit of the minor children 
ias less than the homestead exemption to which Defendant was then en-
:1tled. Defendant merely conveyed to Respondent value she had created 
~clearly. Respondent sustained her burden as grantee to show the good 
:: '.aith of the transaction. The evidence is clear and satisfactory that 
~ conveyance was made in good faith, for a sufficient consideration, 
1~ without8 .intent to defraud. WHETHER A CONVEYANCE IS MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT :,:TUAL INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD A CREDITOR IS DETERMINED BY 3E FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE. 
Another factor to consider in showing the grantee's good faith 
:j-; whether with the consent of the grantee, the granter treated the pro-
1my as his own. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 U 540, 15 P2d 1051 (1932). In 
·~instant case, Respondent, Colleen Merrill, had to obtain a restraining 
:ier to prevent Defendant, Douglas Merrill, from coming on to the prem-
l 0s. Clearly, Defendant did not have Respondent's consent to treat 
\:"property as his own, nor can it be said that Respondent held the 
~erty in secret trust for Defendant. The conveyance wears no bad 
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of fraud. Respondent's good faith cannot be denied. The evidence 
is insufficient to show actual intent to defraud. 
Where the conveyance of real property antedates the judgrr, 
upon which a creditor seeks to levy, evidence is insufficient to sh: 
actual intent to defraud. Hillstead v. Leavitt, 475 P2d 1017 (~~ 
1970). There, the initial funds used to purchase real property h~ 
come from the sale of a violin owned by the wife. The husband and·. 
parlayed the initial investment into more valuable holdings through 
a series of transactions. Title was kept in the wife's name. In a 
later exchange of the Wyoming property for Utah property, the husba: 
returned the interest that had been in his name to the wife. Credi: 
obtained a judgment and alleged that the conveyance to the wife of· 
interest temporarily held in the husband's name was made with actu; 
intent to hinder, delay and defraud. The Court found the evidence: 
sufficient. 
In this case, the value created in the house through the. 
of Respondent, Colleen Merrill, diminished. First, second, and ti~ 
deeds of trust severely reduced the equity. Defendant held an inW 
of $5056. 00; this amount was even less than the $6, 700. 00 homesteac 
exemption to which he was entitle. Defendant's involuntary return: 
Respondent of that depleted interest fourteen months before Appella: 
obtained judgment cannot be said to have been made with actual inte: 
to hinder, delay, or defraud. 
Where creditors have had an opportunity to protect theffi51· 
in the event of debtor's default, the Court has considered this a: 
mary fact. Givan v. Lambeth, supra. There, creditors sold a hea•:: 
20 
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3 uto dealership to debtor. Experienced businessmen, creditors retained 
3 lien on the corporate stock in the event of default on promissory 
notes executed by debtor. Prior to the purchase of the dealership, 
debtor had executed a deed conveying his sheep ranch to his sons who 
h~ long operated it for him. Several months after the purchase of 
the dealership, debtor delivered and the sons recorded the deed. The 
dealership failed. When debtor defaulted, as creditors anticipated, 
they alleged that the conveyance of the ranch was fraudulent. The 
:ourt, however, found no badges of fraud. The evidence was sufficient 
to sustain a finding that the conveyance was not fraudulent. 
Here, Appellants are experienced in business. Appellant 
~ad Runner had first-hand knowledge of Defendant's financial problems; 
ooe of its officers was Defendant's friend who had obtained financing 
in his own name from American Savings, for Defendant, because Defendant 
.1ad such a poor credit rating. Appellants had every opportunity to 
~otect themselves in the event of Defendant's default. Respondent 
~olleen Merrill, did not even know that Defendant had not paid the 
~aterialmen and sub-contractors on the Road Runner construction pro-
ject. It cannot be said that Respondent participated in any fraud 
rn anticipation of which Appellent Road Runner could not have pro-
~cted itself. Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to show actual 
:r.tent to hinder, delay or defraud Appellants. 
The Statute of Elizabeth, from which the Utah Fraudulent 
jnveyances Act is derived, was never intended to prevent a debtor from 
:;;·ing or. securing his honest debts, or from doing equity and exact 
;st ice. Boccalero v. Bee, et. al. , supra. Defendant Douglas Merrill 
:aa an honest obligation to Respondent Colleen Merrill and the two 
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children remaining at home to ?rovide support. In cannot be said t 
Defendant's conveyance even partook of the nature of a voluntary t:; 
fer and is therefore subject to attack. Notwithstanding, Appellar.t' 
have provided no reason to doubt that the truthfulness of the_test 
was so tinctured with perjury as to justify the rejection of it is:~ 
Smith v. Edward, 17 P2d 264 (Utah 1932). 
The evidence is entirely insufficient to show that the c:: 
veyance from Defendant Douglas Merrill, to Respondent Colleen Merr:: 
was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. The Court 
should affirm the conveyance from Defendant of his interest in the 
family home and real property to Respondent, being part of the sett: 
ment of the divorce action between the gr an tor and grantee, as cor.-
cl usi ve against Appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
On February 27, 1976, Respondent, Colleen Merrill, sued:' 
fendant, Douglas Merrill, for divorce and custody of two minor chi:: 
Pursuant to a Stipulation and Property Settlement approved by the :: 
vorce court, Defendant quit- claimed his interest in the family ho:' 
Respondent. At the time of the conveyance, Respondent was not awe: 
that Defendant had not paid the materialmen and subcontractors on' 
construction project for Appellant Road Runner Inn, Inc. 
Respondent, Colleen Merrill, had labored two ( 2) years tc 
build the home at 2341 Neff Lane for her family. The home was he: 
encumbered by first, second, and third deeds of trust and liens. 
joint tenants, Respondent and Defendant each could claim an equi':· 
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·~lued at $5056.00. The homestead exemption of $6,700.00 to which 
Jefendant was entitled exceeded the value of the equity conveyed to 
?espondent Utah Code Annotated, Section 28-1-1 et. ~- (1953). 
On June 30, 1976, Appellants sued Defendant, Douglas Mer-
rill, for breach of the construction contract. On August 15, 1978, 
the matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge . 
. :i.ppellants were awarded a judgment against Defendant in amount of 
328,300.00. The learned and experienced jurist concluded that: 
1) The transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and real 
property located at 2341 Neff Lane, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to the Defendant, Colleen B. Merrill, from the 
Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill, on the 12th day of 
April, 1976, being part of the settlement of the di-
vorce action between the granter and grantee, was for 
a fair consideration. (Amended Conclusion of Law 
No. 5); and 
2) The said transfer by quit-claim deed of the home and 
real property from Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill, to 
Defendant, Colleen B. Merrill, was not a fraudulent 
conveyance. (Amended Conclusion of Law No. 6). 
In this appeal, Respondent, Colleen B. Merrill, pleads that 
the Court affirm the conclusions of the trial court and declare the 
conveyance from Defendant of his interest in the family home and real 
property to Respondent as conclusive against Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of July, 1979. 
JJ!~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
Colleen B. Merrill 
660 South 2nd East 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1035 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Respondent's Brief by hand delivenr.: 
two copies to the following: 
Roger S. Blaylock, Esq. 
MORRIS & BLAYLOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant, Douglas C. Merrill 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
W. Waldan Lloyd 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 30th day of July, 1979. 
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